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Hurricane Katrina and the Legal and Bioethical
Implications of Involuntary Euthanasia as a
Component of Disaster Management in
Extreme Emergency Situations
FrederickaK. Shea*
The delivery of health care in extreme disaster
situations presents the worst case scenarios and
places the most strain on our health care practitioners
and systems. This is apparent even to individuals
who are not involved in the delivery of health care.
Anyone with a television can recall the media
images of people jumping to their deaths and racing
from the collapsing Twin Towers in New York after
the terrorist attacks on September 11th, as well as the
corpses floating through the water while panicked
individuals tried to signal passing helicopters from flooded rooftops after
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. Even as we live in the wake of these
events, we currently cope with the medical disaster involving the H1N1 flu
pandemic. Within the context of the delivery of medical care, the question
that inevitably arises during these events is should, or can, standards and
practices other than those which have been legally and ethically established
be applied given these extreme circumstances? The need to address this
issue is obvious given the reality that it will continue to be raised as we try
to cope with and plan for the medical fallout from future disasters.
One of the most compelling and ultimately troubling examples of an
alleged divergence from accepted legal and bioethical standards under
disaster circumstances arose out of the many allegations of euthanasia at
Memorial Medical Center (Memorial) in New Orleans against a physician
and two nurses during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Dr. Anna Pou, a
respected head and neck surgeon, remained at the hospital throughout the
ordeal although she was initially given the opportunity to evacuate, and
treated the patients from Monday, August 29, 2005, until all remaining
living patients were evacuated on Thursday, September 1. Dr. Pou and
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other Memorial staff members worked under the most extreme and
medically compromised circumstances throughout this period of time, such
as flooding that caused the failure of electricity, the use of back-up
generators and plumbing, and in heat exceeding 100 degrees. At the time of
Hurricane Katrina, Memorial leased the seventh floor of its facility to
LifeCare Hospitals (LifeCare) which operated a long-term acute care unit.
As the physician on call for the unit did not show up during the crisis, Dr.
Pou and other staff members cared for these patients. These patients had
chronic medical conditions, but were not thought to be in imminent danger
of death; the LifeCare floor was not a hospice.
The evacuation process was chaotic, poor, at times lacked governmental
and private response, and was attempted under a breakdown in
communication systems as the result of the power outage. The process of
evacuating most patients involved a forty-five minute process which
included passing the patient through a three by three foot hole in order to
access a helipad. By early Thursday morning, while the staff was
exhausted beyond belief, an announcement was made that the hospital
would be completely evacuated that day. Nine patients remained on the
LifeCare floor. According to an affidavit filed by the Louisiana Attorney
General's Office, Dr. Pou made statements that she was going to administer
lethal doses to these patients, asked for and received narcotics and syringes
which could cause death, and was seen entering and leaving these patients
rooms with two nurses. One year later, Dr. Pou was arrested and charged
with second degree murder for allegedly causing the death of four of the
nine patients. These allegations generated intense outrage and public
criticism in New Orleans, which was still struggling in an attempt to
recover from Katrina. Dr. Pou was seen by the public and echoed in the
press as someone who persevered in the face of disaster while the
government-on the city, state and federal levels-failed to respond by
abandoning not only the general population but its most helpless citizens,
the medically infirm, to fend for themselves. When the allegations were
later presented before a grand jury, no indictments were returned.
Since the allegations, Dr. Pou has been steadfast in maintaining her
innocence and has asserted that the injections she gave were a legally and
ethically justifiable attempt to treat the patients' pain and anxiety, that is, to
provide "comfort care." She denies that they were provided with the intent
to cause death, intent to cause death being a necessary element to prove the
charge of murder as well as to fit within the definition of euthanasia. A
close examination of the witness statements contained within the affidavit
filed by the Attorney General's Office, however, shows apparently
inculpatory statements made by Dr. Pou during the disaster and establishes
an incriminating sequence of events leading up to the injections and
subsequent deaths of the patients. In conjunction with the expert opinions
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol19/iss1/27
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(obtained by the Attorney General's Office) in the affidavit as to the cause
of death, the affidavit presents a compelling circumstantial case contrary to
Dr. Pou's statements.' With the lack of a criminal trial, along with Dr.
Pou's ongoing denial of any intent to cause the deaths of the patients, the
truth is unlikely ever to be known.
This case has generated a substantial amount of ongoing controversy
over the intersecting ethical, legal and medical issues it has raised. End of
life issues, and in particular, end of life decision-making, have been the
subject of ongoing debate and litigation in our society. The allegations
surrounding what happened to the LifeCare patients present an opportunity
to examine these issues within the context of providing medical care in
disaster situations. Ultimately, the question becomes not only whether Dr.
Pou intended to kill or euthanize the patients, but, if she did, were her
actions consistent with the ethical and legal morals our country has
developed regarding end of life issues? Further, if her actions were not, do
the extreme circumstances justify a deviation from these standards?
As a society, we live within certain ethical and legal constraints that
reflect society's ethics and values. The prohibition against intentional
killing in the criminal codes of the states is one of the most obvious
examples of law reflecting ethics or values. Over the last half century, we
have experienced reliance on the law through the use of the courts not only
to resolve disputes concerning the propriety of medical care, but also to
resolve ethical issues concerning medical care. The result has been the
development of a body of law which reflects the rights to freedom and
liberty established by the United States Constitution. This body of law
reflects the trend of deviation from medical paternalism, where physicians
were, in effect, vested with the unilateral authority to make decisions
regarding medical care on behalf of the patient with little or no input from
the patient or even a surrogate and with minimal oversight or
accountability, towards one of patient autonomy and self-determination in
making medical decisions.
Despite this historical deference to physicians, early common law
established the constitutional right to bodily integrity. 2 Justice Cardozo, in
the 1914 case of Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hospital, applied this
1. Aff. of Virginia B. Rider, State of Louisiana v. Anna M. Pou, et. al, No. 59-2652 (La.
Dist. Ct), at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/katrina/lapoui706wrnt.html [hereinafter
referred to as Affidavit]; see also Sheri Fink, M.D., The Deadly Choices at Memorial, N.Y.
TiMEs MAG., Aug. 30, 2009 (discussing the conditions and the events leading up to the
allegations of euthanasia against Memorial and quoting an additional physician as having
admitted to intentionally hastening the demise of at least one patient).
2. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250-51 (1891), (recognizing that "(n)o
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of
every individual to be in possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law").
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right to be free of bodily intrusions to the requirement that physicians and
3
medical personnel obtain patient consent to perform medical procedures.
In 1972, a federal court in the pivotal case of Canterbury v. Spence,4
expanded this right to include the right to informed consent, reasoning that
without informed consent, no meaningful and intelligent consent can be
given. 5 With this ruling, it became clear that medical decisions were no
longer the exclusive domain of doctors - patients began to expect control
over these decisions. Through their decisions, then, the courts began to
reflect this shift.
One of the first cases to attract wide public attention and media coverage
for addressing patients' rights at the end of life was In re Quinlan.6 In this
case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that Ms. Quinlan, who was in a
persistent vegetative state, had the right to have her respirator removed even
if the likely result would be death. Ms. Quinlan's physicians objected that
the removal would not conform to medical practices, standards and
traditions. 7 The court found the patients wishes to be predominant and the
physicians' interests less compelling than the patient's privacy right to
refuse treatment. 8 In addition, the court rejected the concept that a ruling
against the physicians would amount to an inappropriate intrusion of law
into medicine and found that the court was not precluded from reexamining
underlying human values and rights when deciding clearly justiciable
matters. 9 Later, in the 1985 case In re Conroy,10 the same court addressed
the question of whether a nasogastric feeding tube could be removed from
an incompetent nursing home patient with irreversible mental and physical
conditions.11 Unlike its privacy approach in Quinlan, the court based its
decision on the common right to self-determination and informed consent,
and recognized that these rights, which encompass the right to refuse
treatment, outweigh any countervailing state interests. 12
In the landmark case Cruzan v. Dep 't of Health, based upon facts similar
to Quinlan and Conroy, the United States Supreme Court affirmed these
3. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914) (J. Cardozo)
(articulating the doctrine of informed consent: "Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has the right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patients' consent commits an assault, for which he is
liable in damages.").
4. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
5. id.
6. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
7. Id. at 665.
8. Id. at 663-664.
9. Id. at 665.
10. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321 (N.J. 1985).
11. Cruzan v. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990) (citing Conroy, 98 N.J. 321).
12. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol19/iss1/27
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rights in 1985.13 The Court found that the right to informed consent
includes the right to refuse consent and recognized that individuals have a
constitutionally based liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment. 14 The Court further addressed concerns raised regarding the
issue of a surrogate acting on behalf of an incompetent patient to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment and found that the state may protect such patients
by requiring clear and convincing proof the patient's wishes regarding
treatment. The Cruzan court, as well as several lower courts, favored the
use of a "substituted judgment" standard as opposed to a "best interests"
standard. The former requires the surrogate to base decisions on what the
patient's treatment preferences would be, as opposed to the latter, which
allows the surrogate to make decisions based upon what he believes would
be in the best interests of the patient. 15 Additionally, the "best interests"
standard would allow surrogates to make their own subjective
determination of the acceptability of the patient's quality of life when
making a decision to whether to withdraw treatment. 6 According to this
body of case law, then, the "best interests" standard would be inconsistent
with the principles of self-determination, particularly as they apply to end
of life decisions.
Modern medical ethics codes directly reflect these principles. In its
policy regarding informed consent, the American Medical Association
(AMA) indicates that, "(t)he patient should make his or her own
determination on treatment. 17 In its ethical policy regarding withholding
or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, the AMA provides that the
principle of patient autonomy requires that physicians respect a patient's
decision to forego life-sustaining treatment even when it conflicts with a
physician's duty to sustain life and relieve suffering."
Dr. Pou was alleged to have intentionally caused the deaths of the
remaining LifeCare patients. If she provided the injections with the intent
to cause their death, it would amount to murder. Describing the allegations
as euthanasia is not exculpatory. By definition, both murder and euthanasia
involve intentional acts to cause death. The distinction is that euthanasia is
usually done with the motive to relieve pain or suffering. Nevertheless, the

13.

Id.

14. Id. at 269.
15. Id. at 280.
16. Id. at 276.
17. AM. MEDICAL ASSN., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 8.08 (2006), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethies/code-medical-ethics/
opinion808.shtml ("Informed Consent").
18. AM. MEDICAL ASSN., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2.20 (1996), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medica-ethics/
opinion220.shtml ("Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment").
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AMA prohibits euthanasia as inconsistent with the physician's role as a
healer. 19 The courts have neither recognized a right to euthanasia, nor
recognized it as a defense to intentional killing regardless of a motive to
relieve suffering. Furthermore, the acts as alleged would amount to
involuntary euthanasia, which runs directly counter to the rights to informed
consent and patient self-determination.
Physicians inevitably fear any prosecution concerning the administration
of medical care, particularly in situations involving prescribing or
administering narcotics for pain relief. However, the courts, legislators, and
the AMA have recognized that the "principle of double-effect" as protecting
physicians where the intent of the medical treatment was not to cause death,
but to provide palliative care. The distinction lies in the difference between
motive and intent which may have been lost in the aftermath of the tragedy
involving the LifeCare patients. The focus on Dr. Pou's altruism in staying
at the hospital to treat the patients may have overshadowed the real
possibility that the injections were given with the intent to end the patients'
lives. While she may have thought this was the most humane alternative
under these clearly disastrous circumstances, a "good" or merciful motive
will not ethically or legally justify intentional killing.
Providing medical care in disasters and emergencies inevitably
compromises the principles surrounding patient autonomy. Often there are
limited resources and little or no time for the consideration and reflection
that is available under ordinary circumstances. This makes planning for
future disasters and developing frameworks and paradigms for the medical
response to these situations, which address, and are consistent, with
established ethical and legal principles to the greatest extent possible, more,
and not less, important. Incorporating certain rights into these plans, such
as the right to informed consent, presents the greatest challenges.
Paradigms addressing the reality that medical care may have to be
administered without informed consent have been, and need to continue to
be, developed.
Creating an exception to the prohibition against euthanasia in disaster or
extreme emergency situations, however, either by way of expressly
incorporating its use into a framework for disaster response, or simply
condoning it, has no legal or ethical foundation in our country and is not
necessary as a means to cope with disasters. Involuntary euthanasia is
directly contrary to the established principles of patient autonomy and selfdetermination and inevitably requires a determination by the physician of
what is an acceptable quality of life for the patient. Carving out a disaster

19.

AM. MEDICAL AsSN.,

CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2.21

(1996),

available at

http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/
opinion221.shtml ("Euthansia").
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exception to this prohibition would create a dangerous deviation from these
principles under the most volatile circumstances and would jeopardize the
most vulnerable individuals. Incorporating certain moral and legal absolutes
in advance planning to guide decision-making in the chaos surrounding
disasters or emergencies is clearly necessary. Ultimately, the tragedy
involving the LifeCare patients and the allegations of euthanasia leveled
against Dr. Pou, whether valid or not, and the ongoing moral and legal
debate surrounding this situation and the reality that similar situations will
occur, demonstrate the ongoing need for the development of disaster
planning consistent with our society's legal and ethical principles.
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